If you see file:///home/*/.aws/credentials in your logs (or any file:// callback), take immediate action:
After callback writes data:
[default]
aws_access_key_id = ASIA...EXAMPLE
aws_secret_access_key = wJalr...EXAMPLEKEY
aws_session_token = IQoJb3JpZ2luX2Vj...SESSIONTOKEN
First, let’s URL decode that string:
Full decoded value: file:///home/*/.aws/credentials
This is a file URI scheme targeting the default location of AWS credentials on Linux/macOS systems. The wildcard (*) suggests the attacker is hoping to access any user’s home directory. callback-url-file-3A-2F-2F-2Fhome-2F-2A-2F.aws-2Fcredentials
If your software actually interprets callback-url-file:///home/*/.aws/credentials as a valid location to read files from, your system is critically vulnerable.
An attacker who can force your server to read ~/.aws/credentials can steal your Amazon Web Services (AWS) Access Keys. With those keys, the attacker can: If you see file:///home/*/
The * wildcard makes it worse – an attacker could potentially read credentials for any system user without knowing the exact username.
Since the original string is invalid, here are three legitimate, long-form article topics that match what you likely intended: First, let’s URL decode that string:
| Your original string's intent | Correct article topic |
| :--- | :--- |
| The file:// protocol & local files | [How to securely handle file:// URIs in applications (and why you should avoid them in callbacks)] |
| Reading .aws/credentials via a callback | [Protecting AWS credentials from SSRF and open redirect attacks] |
| URL-encoded file paths in OAuth | [Proper OAuth callback URL validation: why local file paths must be blocked] |