Most U.S. Land Courts (e.g., Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 185, § 53) hold that no title to registered land, whether legal or equitable, shall be acquired by adverse possession or prescription unless the use has been actual, open, continuous, notorious, and adverse for a period of not less than 20 years and the registered owner had actual knowledge of the adverse claim or the claim is noted on the certificate of title.
Here, Coastal’s title certificate contains no mention of any easement in favor of IRA. IRA did not file a notice of claim until 2005 (Docket 911.03), long after the twenty-year period (1963–1983) would have matured. Under Brackett v. Algonquin Gas Transmission Co. (Mass. Land Ct. 1999), failure to note an easement on the certificate renders the easement unenforceable against a subsequent bona fide purchaser. Coastal acquired the property in 2001 without notice of IRA’s claim; therefore, the prescriptive period effectively reset as to Coastal as a registered owner.
Short-term fixes applied:
Planned long-term actions:
This incident underscores the interplay between caching strategy and downstream capacity controls; improving coordination between release actions and operational safeguards will reduce recurrence risk.
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Chapter LS: Land Subdivision - City of Lambertville, NJ - eCode360
The LST applied the “Three‑Prong Test” established in Riverside v. State (2021‑SC‑014):
The LST framed the dispute around four principal questions: Most U
These issues intersect statutory interpretation, constitutional law, and administrative law principles. The tribunal’s reasoning therefore offers a rich tapestry of legal analysis.
Because the LPA’s easement order was not within the statutory grant of power, the tribunal held the order to be ultra vires and therefore void ab initio. The LST stressed that the doctrine of ultra vires is a protective mechanism ensuring agencies do not overreach statutory bounds.
