The Holy Grail for a "better" bypass is DA hijacking. Here is how it works:
A critical authentication bypass vulnerability exists in the boot chain of the MediaTek MT6789 chipset. By interrupting the preloader's USB handshake during a specific timing window, an attacker with physical USB access can bypass Secure Boot and Download Agent Authentication (DAA). This grants unauthorized access to the device's flash memory (UFS/eMMC), allowing full firmware extraction, permanent malware installation, or device bricking. mt6789 auth bypass better
CVSS 3.1 Score: 7.8 (High) – AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H The Holy Grail for a "better" bypass is DA hijacking
To understand why the new bypass is "better," we have to look at why the old one was terrible. To understand why the new bypass is "better,"
Previous methods often relied on exploiting generic MediaTek vulnerabilities (like kamakiri or mtk-bypass) that worked flawlessly on older chips (MT6735, MT6765, etc.). However, the MT6789 (and similar newer architectures) updated its Boot ROM (BROM) handler logic.
This improved method targets the communication handshake between the preloader and the authentication server (or local secure storage), rather than brute-forcing or patching the boot image.
By hooking the USB handshake between BootROM and the host, one can substitute a signed but benign DA from an older MTK chip (e.g., MT6765) before switching to a patched DA. MT6789 checks only the first DA’s signature, not subsequent ones.